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HIDING BEHIND THE VEIL OF AMBIGUITY: 
WHY COURTS SHOULD APPLY THE PLAIN 
MEANING OF THE DODD-FRANK 
WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISIONS 
DANIEL GILPIN† 
INTRODUCTION 
Whistleblowing is a high-stakes business.  Although a 
whistleblower may receive huge rewards for uncovering a 
securities law violation,1 he or she may also live in fear of facing 
retaliation by his or her employer.2  In 2014, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) paid out more awards to 
whistleblowers than in all previous years combined.3 
In 2010, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) “[t]o 
promote the financial stability of the United States by improving 
accountability and transparency in the financial system.”4  To 
improve accountability and transparency, Congress created a 
bounty program to incentivize whistleblowers with awards for 
 
† Notes and Comments Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2017, St. 
John’s University School of Law; B.A., 2012, Providence College. 
1 Christina Rexrode & Timothy W. Martin, Whistleblowers Score a Big Payday: 
Three Individuals, One Firm To Receive $170 Million in Bank of America Probe, 
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/third-whistleblower-to-
collect-reward-related-to-bank-of-america-settlement-1419014474. 
2 See Jennifer M. Pacella, Inside or Out? The Dodd-Frank Whistleblower 
Program’s Antiretaliation Protections for Internal Reporting, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 721, 
754 (2014) (stating that whistleblowers may fear poor performance reviews, 
disqualifications from bonuses, thwarted career development, termination, difficulty 
in obtaining new employment without employer recommendations, social ostracism, 
office harassment, and even threats). 
3 SEC, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DODD-FRANK 
WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 10 (2014), http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/annual-
report-2014.pdf [hereinafter 2014 ANNUAL REPORT]. 
4 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, 
and 15 U.S.C.). 
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helpful tips given to the SEC.5  However, it is currently unclear 
who qualifies as a Dodd-Frank whistleblower.6  Courts are split 
on whether an individual must report violations to the SEC or if 
it is sufficient to report to internal management to qualify as a 
whistleblower.7  This threshold question is of utmost importance 
because only whistleblowers qualify for protection under Dodd-
Frank’s antiretaliation provision.8 
In September 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit created a split of authority with the Fifth 
Circuit on the statutory definition of a Dodd-Frank 
whistleblower.9  In Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC,10 the Second 
Circuit determined that the definition provision and 
antiretaliation provision conflicted with one another, finding that 
the statute was ambiguous.11  In light of this ambiguity, the 
Second Circuit deferred to the SEC’s interpretation of the statute 
and held that an individual qualifies as a whistleblower, and is 
therefore protected under the antiretaliation provision, whether 
he or she reports to the SEC or reports internally.12  On the other 
hand, in Asadi v. G.E. Energy,13 the Fifth Circuit followed the 
narrow statutory definition of whistleblower found in the text of 
Dodd-Frank and held that an employee must report to the SEC 
in order to qualify as a whistleblower and thus, to qualify for 
antiretaliation protection.14 
This Note argues that a plain reading of the statute—as 
championed by the Fifth Circuit—is correct in that an individual 
qualifies as a whistleblower only when she reports a violation to 
the SEC.  Part I provides a history and background of modern 
antiretaliation whistleblower legislation.  Part I also discusses 
the circumstances surrounding the passage of Dodd-Frank, the 
 
5 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b) (2012). 
6 Compare Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 629 (5th Cir. 
2013), with Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 155 (2d Cir. 2015). 
7 Compare Asadi, 720 F.3d at 629 (holding that only those individuals who 
report to the SEC qualify as whistleblowers), with Berman, 801 F.3d at 155 (holding 
that those individuals who report internally, as well as those who report to the SEC, 
qualify as whistleblowers). 
8 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2012). 
9 Compare Asadi, 720 F.3d at 629, with Berman, 801 F.3d at 155. 
10 801 F.3d 145. 
11 Berman, 801 F.3d at 155. 
12 Id. 
13 720 F.3d 620. 
14 Id. at 629. 
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text of the whistleblower provisions, and the relevant SEC 
regulations.  Part II outlines the recent case law on the issue of 
who qualifies as a Dodd-Frank whistleblower.  Part III argues 
that only individuals who report to the SEC qualify as Dodd-
Frank whistleblowers and addresses criticism of that reasoning. 
I. A HISTORY OF MODERN ANTIRETALIATION WHISTLEBLOWER 
LEGISLATION 
A. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) in 
the wake of the Enron scandal.15  In October 2001, Enron shocked 
the financial world when it announced a $618 million loss for the 
third quarter, which led to a $1.2 billion drop in shareholder 
value.16  Federal investigations—and eventually indictments—
followed.17  Sherron Watkins, a vice president at Enron, came 
forward and testified before Congress regarding the complex 
accounting scheme used by Enron to inflate its public value.18  
Watkins had reported the accounting scheme anonymously to 
both the CFO and the chairman of the board of directors.19  She 
hoped her reports would result in reform, but Enron immediately 
sought legal advice about whether Watkins could be terminated 
without repercussions.20  Watkins was eventually relegated from 
her executive suite to a meager office and given menial tasks.21 
 
 
 
15 S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 2 (2002). 
16 Id.; see also Josh Emshwiller & Rebecca Smith, Enron Posts Surprise 3rd-
Quarter Loss After Investment, Asset Write-Downs, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 17, 2001), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1003237924744857040. 
17 See generally Indictment, United States v. Arthur Andersen LLP, Cr. No. 
CRH–02–121, 2002 WL 33949318 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 7, 2002); Indictment, United 
States v. Fastow, Cr. No. CRH-02-0665, 2003 WL 22331357 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 
2003). 
18 See generally The Financial Collapse of Enron—Part 3: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and 
Commerce, 107th Cong. 15–16 (2003) (statement of Sherron Watkins, Vice President 
of Corporate Development, Enron Corp.). 
19 Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to Worldcom and Beyond: Life and Crime 
After Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 357, 360–61 (2003). 
20 Id. at 362–63. 
21 Id. at 363. 
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Senators reacted with fury when they learned that Enron 
sought to fire Watkins for disclosing her findings instead of 
correcting the accounting fraud.22  As a result, Congress included 
whistleblower protections in SOX in an effort to make potential 
whistleblowers comfortable with reporting potential violations.23 
SOX protects whistleblowers by outlawing retaliation by 
publicly traded companies against employees who provide 
information about securities law violations.24  Employees are 
protected in providing information to (1) a federal regulatory or 
law enforcement agency; (2) Congress; or (3) a supervisor with 
authority to investigate.25  An aggrieved employee has an 
enforcement procedure if he or she has been a victim of employer 
retaliation.26  First, the employee must file an administrative 
complaint with the Secretary of Labor.27  Second, and only if that 
administrative complaint does not result in a final decision 
within 180 days, the employee has a private cause of action 
before a federal district court for wrongful retaliation.28  This 
administrative filing requirement is a type of administrative 
exhaustion requirement.29  The administrative exhaustion 
requirement presents difficult procedural hurdles to 
whistleblowers.30  A successful SOX whistleblower’s relief is 
reinstatement with the same seniority status, back pay with 
interest, special damages, costs, and reasonable attorney fees.31  
The statute of limitations for a SOX cause of action is 180 days 
after the violation occurs or 180 days after the employee became 
aware of the violation.32 
 
22 S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 5 (2002). Other potential whistleblowers came 
forward, claiming that they were silenced when they questioned Enron’s stock 
valuations or financial practices. See, e.g., Man Says Advice To Sell Enron Led to 
Firing, N. Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/05/business/ 
man-says-advice-to-sell-enron-led-to-firing.html. 
23 S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 10 (2002); see generally 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012). 
24 See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a). 
25 Id. 
26 See id. § 1514A(b). 
27 Id. § 1514A(b)(1)(A). 
28 Id. § 1514A(b)(1)(B). 
29 See, e.g., Wong v. CKX, Inc., 890 F. Supp. 2d 411, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
30 Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why 
Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 100–01 
(2007). 
31 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c). 
32 Id. § 1514A(b)(2)(D). 
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B. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010 
1. Legislation in Reponse to the Financial Crisis 
Congress’s most recent antiretaliation whistleblower 
legislation was a part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”).  Dodd-Frank 
was passed in the wake of the financial collapse in the late 
2000s.33  In 2008, Lehman Brothers, a financial titan, filed for 
bankruptcy in the wake of nationwide escalating foreclosures.34  
As a result, institutions stopped issuing commercial paper35 and 
the financial world came to a screeching halt.36  The financial 
crisis deepened, affecting all consumer borrowers.37  Commentary 
after the financial crisis generally called for more stringent 
government regulation.38 
2. The Whistleblower Provisions 
This Note focuses on the whistleblower provisions of Dodd-
Frank, particularly the definition and antiretaliation sections 
located in 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (the “Dodd-Frank Whistleblower 
Provisions”).  In the wake of the 2008 financial collapse, Congress 
 
33 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 7, 12, and 15 U.S.C.). 
34 Andrew Ross Sorkin, Lehman Files for Bankruptcy; Merrill Is Sold, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 14, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/business/15lehman.html. 
35 Commercial paper is a source of short-term financing, usually with 
repayment due one day to ninety days later. It is used by banking institutions to 
finance their daily operations when they loan more than they have on hand. See 
Shah Gilani, Credit Crisis Update: An Inside Look at the Commercial Paper Debacle, 
MONEY MORNING (Oct. 9, 2008), http://moneymorning.com/2008/10/09/credit-crisis-
update. 
36 Id. (“[T]he immediate problem is the commercial paper market. It’s 
dead. . . . [It is an] inevitable contagion spreading like nuclear winter across the 
globe.”) 
37 See Vikas Bajaj & Louise Story, Mortgage Crisis Spreads Past Subprime 
Loans, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/12/business/ 
12credit.html (discussing how prime borrowers, in addition to subprime borrowers, 
became unable to get any credit because the financial industry’s knee-jerk reaction 
to tighten lending standards); see also S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 9 (2010) (“[M]illions of 
Americans have lost jobs; millions of American families have lost trillions of dollars 
in net worth; millions of Americans have lost their homes; and millions of Americans 
have lost their retirement, college, and other savings.”). 
38 See Gary S. Becker, The Great Recession and Government Failure, WALL ST. 
J. (Sept. 2, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111904199404576536 
930606933332. 
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passed Dodd-Frank “[t]o promote the financial stability of the 
United States by improving accountability and transparency in 
the financial system.”39  Among other things, Dodd-Frank 
established a whistleblower reward program40 and provides 
whistleblowers with a cause of action for wrongful retaliation by 
an employer.41 
Under Dodd-Frank, a whistleblower is defined as “any 
individual who provides . . . information relating to a violation of 
the securities laws to the Commission, in a manner established, 
by rule or regulation, by the Commission.”42  The second part of 
the statute at issue is the antiretaliation provision under 
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A).  Specifically, an employer may not: 
[D]ischarge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, directly or 
indirectly, or in any other manner discriminate against, a 
whistleblower in the terms and conditions of employment 
because of any lawful act done by the whistleblower— 
(i) in providing information to the Commission in accordance 
with this section; 
(ii) in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any investigation 
or judicial or administrative action of the Commission based 
upon or related to such information; or 
(iii) in making disclosures that are required or protected under 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.), this 
chapter, including [§] 78j-1(m) of this title, [§] 1513(e) of Title 
18, and any other law, rule, or regulation subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Commission.43 
For the sake of brevity, this Note refers to each of the respective 
subsections of the antiretaliation provision as subsection (i), 
subsection (ii), and subsection (iii). 
Courts have had to interpret whether, under subsection (iii), 
individuals who report internally to management qualify as 
Dodd-Frank whistleblowers.  A plain reading of the statute 
seems to indicate they do not because the statutory definition is 
incorporated in the antiretaliation provision; a person who 
 
39 Pub. L. No. 111-203, pmbl., 124 Stat 1376, 1376 (2010). 
40 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1) (2012) (entitling a whistleblower to anywhere between 
ten percent and thirty percent of sanctions that are imposed in the action). 
41 Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i) (“An individual who alleges discharge or other 
discrimination in violation of subparagraph (A) may bring an action under this 
subsection in the appropriate district court of the United States . . . .”). 
42 Id. § 78u-6(a)(6). 
43 Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A). 
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reports to the SEC is protected from retaliation for making three 
different types of disclosures under the statute.44  The Fifth 
Circuit and some district courts have ruled that this plain 
reading of the statute is correct.45  However, several district 
courts, and most recently the Second Circuit, either read the 
statute in a contorted fashion to find ambiguity or read 
subsection (iii) as an implied exception to the definition of a 
whistleblower.46 
Unfortunately, because Congress passed Dodd-Frank in 
quick fashion, there is little legislative history from which to 
discern if Congress intended anything other than the plain 
meaning of the statute to control.47  However, what little exists is 
very telling.  In its report, the House of Representatives was 
pleased that Dodd-Frank “enhances incentives and protections 
for whistleblower providing information leading to successful 
SEC enforcement actions.”48  The Senate, in its report, was 
impressed that the new whistleblower program was “designed to 
motivate people who know of securities violations to tell the 
SEC.”49 
 
 
44 Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.2d 145, 157 (2d Cir. 2015) (Jacobs, J., 
dissenting) (stating “[this] is the more natural reading of the statute.”) 
45 See Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 629 (5th Cir. 2013); 
Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 3d 640, 644 (E.D. Wis. 2014); 
Banko v. Apple Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 749, 756 (N.D. Cal. 2013); Wagner v. Bank of 
Am. Corp., Civil Action No. 12-cv-00381-RBJ, 2013 WL 3786643, at*5 (D. Colo. July 
19, 2013), aff’d on different grounds, 571 F. App’x. 698 (10th Cir. 2014). 
46 See e.g. Berman, 801 F.3d at 155 (“[A]t a minimum, the tension between the 
definition . . . subsection . . .  and the limited protection provided by [subsection] 
(iii) . . . if it is subject to that definition section renders [the Whistleblower 
Provisions] sufficiently ambiguous.”); see also Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 119 F. 
Supp. 3d 1088, 1104–05 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (leave granted to appeal to the 9th Cir.); 
Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters (Markets) LLC, 984 F. Supp. 2d 141, 147–48 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013); Ellington v. Giacoumakis, 977 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 (D. Mass. 2013); 
Murray v. UBS Sec., LLC, No. 12 Civ. 5914(JMF), 2013 WL 2190084, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 21, 2013); Genberg v. Porter, 935 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1106–07 (D. Colo. 2013); 
Kramer v. Trans-Lux Corp., No. 3:11cv1424 (SRU), 2012 WL 4444820, at *5 (D. 
Conn. Sept. 25, 2012); Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202(LBS), 2011 WL 
1672066, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011). 
47 Only one House report and one Senate report speak to the whistleblower 
issue. 
48 H.R. REP. NO. 111-517, at 727 (2010) (Conf. Rep.). It would be bizarre for 
Congress to think that internal disclosures would lead to “successful SEC 
enforcement actions.” 
49 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 38 (2010) (Conf. Rep.). 
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In Dodd-Frank, relief for a successful plaintiff is defined as 
(1) reinstatement with the same seniority status that the 
individual would have had, but for the discrimination; (2) two 
times back pay with interest; and (3) litigation costs and 
reasonable attorney fees.50  The statute of limitation for a Dodd-
Frank cause of action is between six to ten years, depending on 
when the whistleblower learned of the violation.51 
There are three important differences between the SOX 
antiretaliation cause of action and the Dodd-Frank 
antiretaliation cause of action.  First, the Dodd-Frank cause of 
action provides greater monetary damages than the SOX cause of 
action because Dodd-Frank allows for double back pay, whereas 
SOX only allows for actual back pay.52  Second, the Dodd-Frank 
cause of action does not have an administrative exhaustion 
requirement, whereas the SOX cause of action does.53  Third, the 
Dodd-Frank cause of action has a statute of limitations that is at 
least ten times as long as the statute of limitations for the SOX 
cause of action.54  As a result, plaintiffs usually prefer to proceed 
under a Dodd-Frank cause of action. 
3. SEC Regulations 
The SEC promulgated rules and regulations regarding the 
Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions pursuant to authority 
delegated by Congress.55  In November 2010, the SEC issued its 
proposed rule, Regulation 21F, and sought comments from the 
public.56  The proposed rule prompted vigorous discussion; the 
SEC received more than 240 comment letters and 1,300 form 
 
50 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C) (2012). 
51 The statute of limitation is (1) six years from the date of the violation, or 
(2) three years after the date when a Plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have 
discovered facts that indicate she has a cause of action—to a maximum of ten years 
after the date of the violation. See id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(iii). 
52 Compare id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C)(ii), with 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2)(B). 
53 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1) (2012), with 18 U.S.C. § 1514(b)(1). 
54 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(iii) (providing for a statute of limitations 
between six to ten years after the violation), with 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(D) 
(providing for a statue of limitations of 180 days after the violation occurs or 180 
days after the employee becomes aware of the violation). 
55 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(j) (2012) (“The [SEC] shall have the authority to issue 
such rules and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to implement the 
provisions of this section consistent with the purposes of this section.”). 
56 See generally Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 75 Fed. Reg. 70488-01 (proposed Nov. 17, 2010) 
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240, 249). 
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letters.57  Many comments from large corporations and corporate 
interest groups suggested amendments that required 
whistleblowers to report internally before reporting to the SEC,58 
similar to the SOX requirement of internal reporting before 
external reporting.59  Some commenters strongly disagreed with 
those suggested amendments.60  One commenter stated, “Dodd-
Frank was a knowing Congressional repudiation of the Sarbanes-
Oxley school of preventative corporate compliance.”61 
In the first part of its two part final rule, the SEC defines a 
whistleblower “as an individual who . . . provides information to 
the [SEC] relating to a potential violation of the securities 
laws.”62  The second part of the final rule discusses the 
antiretaliation provision, and indicates that it creates “three 
different categories of whistleblowers, and the third category 
includes individuals who report to persons or governmental 
authorities other than the [SEC].”63  The SEC reasoned that this 
is a reasonable interpretation because it supports a core objective 
of the SEC’s whistleblower rulemaking—to avoid disincentivizing 
individuals from reporting internally in appropriate 
 
57 Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34300, 
34300 (June 13, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240, 249). A list of the 
submitted comments is available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-
10/s73310.shtml. 
58 See Comment Letter on Proposed Whistleblower Rules from Steven Fagell, 
Esq., Covington and Burling, LLP, to Sarit Klein & Stephen L. Cohen (Feb. 18, 
2011) (on file with the SEC), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-273.pdf; 
Comment Letter on Proposed Whistleblower Rules from David Baris, Exec. Dir., 
American Ass’n of Bank Dirs., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n 
(Dec. 17, 2010) [hereinafter Ass’n of Bank Dirs. Comment Letter] (on file with the 
SEC), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-213.pdf; Hearing on Legis. 
Proposals To Address the Negative Consequences of the Dodd Frank Whistleblower 
Provisions Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters., 112th 
Cong. (2011) (statement of Ken Daly, President and CEO, NACD), https://www. 
sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-312.pdf. 
59 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(b)(1) (2012); see also discussion supra Section I.A. 
60 See Comment Letter on Proposed Whistleblower Rules from Kurt S. Schulzke, 
Esq, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, SEC (Dec. 17, 2010) [hereinafter Schulzke] (on file 
with the SEC), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-201.pdf; Hearing on 
Legis. Proposals To Address the Negative Consequences of the Dodd-Frank 
Whistleblower Provisions Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t Sponsored 
Enters., 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Professor of 
Law, Univ. of Toledo Coll. of Law). 
61 Schulzke, supra note 60. 
62 Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34300, 
34301 (June 13, 2011) (to be codified at 17 CFR pt. 240). 
63 Id. at 34304. 
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circumstances.64  The SEC sought to avoid creating a two-tiered 
system of antiretaliation provisions favoring those who report to 
the SEC, which the SEC stated would disincentivize internal 
reporting.65 
The SEC was also concerned with reports made to law 
enforcement agencies, because those reports would not qualify 
under a narrow reading of “to the Commission” under the 
whistleblower definition.66  In its amicus brief to the Second 
Circuit, the SEC provided a hypothetical to illustrate the 
consequences of reading the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower 
Provisions narrowly.  The hypothetical stated that if an 
individual reported securities fraud to the FBI and the employer 
terminated the individual before any report was made to the 
SEC, then the individual would not qualify as a whistleblower 
and therefore, would not be protected under the antiretaliation 
provision.67  In that situation, the terminated individual would 
only have recourse under SOX.68 
Currently, there is a split of authority among the circuit 
courts on whether this SEC regulation is an unreasonable 
interpretation of a clear Congressional mandate or a reasonable 
clarification of an ambiguous statute.69 
II. RECENT CASE LAW 
A. Court of Appeals Rulings 
1. Asadi 
In Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C.,70 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the text of the 
Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions was unambiguous and 
only those individuals who report violations to the SEC qualify as 
 
64 Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant at 29, Berman v. 
Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2015) (No.14-4626), 2015 WL 636112 
[hereinafter SEC 2d Cir. Amicus Brief]. 
65 Id. at 29. 
66 Id. at 34. 
67 Id. at 34–35. 
68 Id. 
69 Compare Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 630 (5th Cir. 
2013), with Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 155 (2d Cir. 2015). 
70 720 F.3d 620. 
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Dodd-Frank whistleblowers.71  In Asadi, Plaintiff was defendant-
employer’s Iraq Country Executive.72  Iraqi officials informed 
Plaintiff that Defendant hired a woman closely associated with a 
senior Iraqi official in order to curry favor with that official in 
negotiating a lucrative agreement.73  Plaintiff reported this issue 
to his supervisor, fearing that this was a violation of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”).74  Plaintiff was given a 
“surprisingly negative review” after that internal report and was 
fired one year later.75 
Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging a violation of the Dodd-
Frank antiretaliation provision because he was terminated for 
his internal reports to management regarding possible FCPA 
violations.76  Defendant moved to dismiss on the premise that 
Plaintiff failed to state a claim for relief, arguing that since 
Plaintiff did not report a violation to the SEC, Plaintiff did not 
qualify as a Dodd-Frank whistleblower.77  The district court 
dismissed the complaint on other grounds.78  On appeal, the Fifth 
Circuit “start[ed] and end[ed] [its] analysis with the text of the 
relevant statute—15 U.S.C. § 78u-6.”79  The court first examined 
the structure of the section, noting that subsection (a) provided a 
list of definitions, including the term whistleblower and that 
subsection (h) defined what actions could not be taken against 
defined whistleblowers.80 
The court determined that the statutory definition of 
whistleblower and the antiretaliation provision do not conflict for 
two reasons.81  First, the court reasoned that the antiretaliation 
provision uses the term “whistleblower” rather than “employee” 
or “individual,” which are used in other sections.  This suggests 
that Congress intended the prohibited activity section to only 
apply to whistleblowers as statutorily defined.82  Second, the 
court addressed a critique of this reasoning—that it renders 
 
71 Id. at 629. 
72 Id. at 621. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 623. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 626–27. 
82 Id. 
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subsection (iii) superfluous—by reading subsection (iii) as 
antiretaliation protection for other required disclosures other 
than reporting to the SEC.83  This would arise when an employee 
reports a securities law violation to its employer and 
simultaneously reports to the SEC without informing its 
employer.84  If the employer terminates the employee for the 
internal report, subsection (iii) prevents the employer from 
arguing that, because it did not know about the SEC report, the 
employee is not entitled to antiretaliation protection, despite 
being a statutorily defined whistleblower.85  The court reasoned 
that its narrow reading does not render subsection (iii) 
superfluous because this simultaneous reporting example is a 
conceivable one.86 
The court also reasoned that allowing those who report 
internally to qualify as whistleblowers would render the SOX 
antiretaliation provision moot.87  If internal reporting qualified 
one to be a Dodd-Frank whistleblower, every plaintiff would file 
her claim as a Dodd-Frank whistleblower and not a SOX 
whistleblower.  This is because Dodd-Frank whistleblowers 
receive double the back pay88 and have no administrative 
exhaustion requirement.89  Plaintiff’s final argument was that 
the court should give Chevron deference to the SEC’s regulations 
because the SEC is the agency charged with enforcing the Dodd-
Frank Act.90  The court rejected that argument because Chevron 
deference is only given to an agency where the statute is 
ambiguous and the agency’s interpretation is a reasonable one.91  
Here, the court explained that the statute is unambiguous and  
 
 
 
 
 
83 Id. at 627. For example, attorneys are required to report internally evidence 
of a material violation of securities law to the chief legal counsel or chief executive 
officer. 15 U.S.C. § 7245(1) (2012). 
84 Asadi, 720 F.3d. at 627–28. 
85 Id. at 628. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C) (2012), with 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2) 
(2012). 
89 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h), with 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1). 
90 Asadi, 720 F.3d. at 629. 
91 Id. at 629–30. 
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the SEC’s interpretation unreasonably expands the definition of 
whistleblower beyond a plain reading of the statute.92  
Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal.93 
2. Berman 
In Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC,94 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the text of the Dodd-
Frank Whistleblower Provisions was ambiguous and therefore, 
gave deference to the SEC’s interpretation of the definition of a 
whistleblower, which includes those who report a violation to the 
SEC and those who report a violation internally.95  Defendant 
was a media agency, owned by a parent company, which provided 
digital and direct media services.96  Plaintiff was defendant-
employer’s finance director.97  Plaintiff was responsible for the 
company’s financial reporting, compliance with Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”), and the internal 
accounting procedures of Defendant and its parent company.98  
Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he discovered fraudulent 
accounting procedures that violated GAAP, SOX, and Dodd-
Frank.99  Plaintiff reported these potential violations internally 
to a senior officer and defendant’s Audit Committee.100  The 
senior officer was upset with Plaintiff and fired him for his 
internal report of the potential violations.101 
When Plaintiff filed suit, Defendant moved to dismiss, 
arguing that Plaintiff failed to state a claim for relief because he 
did not qualify as a Dodd-Frank whistleblower, as he did not 
report a violation to the SEC.102  The district court agreed and 
dismissed the case.103  On appeal, the Second Circuit stated that 
the question presented was whether reading the two sections of  
 
 
 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 630. 
94 801 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2015). 
95 Id. at 155. 
96 Id. at 149. 
97 Id. at 148. 
98 Id. at 148–49. 
99 Id. at 149. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
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the Dodd-Frank Whistleblowers Provisions together made the 
text sufficiently unclear to warrant Chevron deference to the 
SEC’s interpretation.104 
The court determined that reading the statutory definition of 
whistleblower and subsection (iii) together drastically limited the 
scope of subsection (iii) to cover only people who report a 
violation internally and to the SEC simultaneously.105  Reading 
the statutory definition of whistleblower in conjunction with 
subsection (iii) is especially problematic because under federal 
law, some whistleblowers, like auditors and attorneys,106 are 
required to report violations internally before reporting to the 
SEC.107  The court recognized that subsection (iii) was added at 
the last minute.108  In light of that, the court was “doubtful that 
the conferees who accepted the last-minute insertion of 
sub[section] (iii) would have expected it to have the extremely 
limited scope it would have if it were restricted by the [SEC] 
reporting requirement in the ‘whistleblower’ definition in 
subsection 21F(a)(6).”109  After discussing that in dicta,110 the 
court determined that the tension between the definition section 
and the antiretaliation provision makes the statute ambiguous 
and determined the SEC’s interpretation was reasonable under 
Chevron.111  The case was remanded for further proceedings.112 
The dissent criticized the majority’s reasoning as an attempt 
to rewrite the statute in order to close a perceived gap in 
protection for whistleblowers.113  The dissent noted that the 
 
104 Id. at 150. The court stated that King v. Burwell was the controlling 
precedent for an analysis of a possibly ambiguous statute and that the court was not 
conducting a review under the absurdity doctrine. Id. 
105 Id. at 150–51. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 151. 
108 Id. at 152–53. 
109 Id. at 155. 
110 Id.. (“If we had to choose between reading the statute literally or broadly to 
carry out its apparent purpose, we might well favor the latter course. However, we 
need not definitively construe the statute, because, at a minimum, the tension 
between the definition in subsection 21F(a)(6) and the limited protection provided by 
sub[section] (iii) of subsection 21F(h)(1)(A) if it is subject to that definition renders 
section 21F as a whole sufficiently ambiguous to oblige us to give Chevron deference 
to the reasonable interpretation of the agency charged with administering the 
statute.”). 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 155 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). 
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majority misquoted the statute by substituting the term 
“employee” for the term “whistleblower” in the antiretaliation 
provision.114  Because the term whistleblower is expressly 
defined, the majority should have looked to the definition section, 
but instead “look[ed] here, there and everywhere—except to the 
statutory text.”115  The majority’s finding of ambiguity was 
improper because the plain reading of the statute only leaves 
subsection (iii) “extremely limited [in] scope.”116  As the dissent 
pointed out, “[t]he U.S. Code is full of statutory provisions with 
‘extremely limited’ effect,” and that alone does not make a statute 
ambiguous.117  The dissent concluded that the majority should 
not have “cast aside plain statutory text just because they harbor 
‘doubt[s]’ about what was going on in the heads of individual 
‘conferees’ during the legislative process.”118 
B. District Court Rulings 
Many district courts have interpreted the language and 
structure of the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions.  These 
opinions are best understood in three categories: (1) reading as 
unambiguous; (2) reading as ambiguous; and (3) reading 
subsection (iii) as an implied exception to the definition of 
whistleblower.  The second and third categories of reading 
occasionally overlap.119 
 
114 Id. at 157. 
115 Id. at 158. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. The dissent also noted that the majority wisely did not discuss the 
absurdity doctrine, in recognition that the result of a plain reading does not create 
an absurd result, merely a narrow one. Id. at n.1. (citing Church of the Holy Trinity 
v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 460 (1892) (holding that “[i]f a literal construction of 
the words of a statute be absurd, the act must be so construed as to avoid the 
absurdity.”)). The dissent went on to distinguish from King v. Burwell, which the 
majority relied upon. Id. at 159. In King, the Supreme Court determined that one 
subsection’s plain meaning, which prevented establishing health care exchanges, 
cannot stand in an act that was designed to establish health care exchanges. See 
Berman, 801 F.3d at 159 (citing King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015)). The 
dissent pointed out that here “the sole consequence of applying the statute as 
written is that those who report securities violations only to their employer will 
receive statutory protection that in the SEC's view is sub-optimal.” Id. 
118 Id. at 160 (alteration in original) (citing majority opinion at 155). 
119 See e.g., Murray v. UBS Sec., LLC, No. 12 Civ. 5914(JMF), 2013 WL 
2190084, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013); Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 
8202(LBS), 2011 WL 1672066, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011). 
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1. Reading as Unambiguous 
Three district courts (“the Unambiguous Courts”) have 
followed the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning and found the Dodd-Frank 
Whistleblower Provisions unambiguous.120  “Each district court 
determined that the definition section defines whistleblower and 
that the anti-retaliation provision lists what protected actions 
whistleblowers can take.”121  One court noted, “Congress could 
have used a word other than ‘whistleblower’ [in the 
antiretaliation provision] but chose not to.”122  Another court 
remarked that there is nothing ambiguous about the fact that 
“one may engage in protected activity and yet not qualify as a 
whistleblower” under the statute.123  That court stated that any 
argument against such understanding is an argument based 
solely on a disagreement about public policy, and not statutory 
interpretation.124  The Unambiguous Courts disagreed with the 
courts that read the statute as ambiguous (the “Ambiguous 
Courts”) in their application of the surplusage doctrine to the 
Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions.  Further, the 
Unambiguous Courts stated that, although their interpretation 
may render the term “to the Commission” superfluous in the 
antiretaliation provision, the Ambiguous Courts’ interpretation 
renders the entire statutory whistleblower definition 
superfluous.125 
 
 
 
 
120 See Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 3d 640, 644 (E.D. Wis. 
2014); Banko v. Apple Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 749, 756 (N.D. Cal. 2013); Wagner v. 
Bank of Am. Corp., Civil Action No. 12-cv-00381-RBJ, 2013 WL 3786643, at *5 (D. 
Colo. July 19, 2013), aff’d on different grounds, 571 F. App’x. 698 (10th Cir. 2014). 
121 See Verfuerth, 65 F. Supp. 3d at 645; Wagner, 2013 WL 3786643, at *6 (citing 
Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013)); Banko, 20 F. 
Supp. 3d at 756. 
122 Banko, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 756 (citing Asadi, 720 F.3d at 626). 
123 Verfuerth, 65 F. Supp. 3d at 644. The Verfuerth court made this point again, 
stating “[c]reating a class of people (whistleblowers) and then protecting them from 
various discriminatory acts in addition to the act that qualified them for that class 
does not produce ambiguity or conflict.” Id. at 645. 
124 See id. at 644. 
125 Id. at 644–45. 
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2. Reading as Ambiguous 
The Ambiguous Courts analyzed the Dodd-Frank 
Whistleblower Provisions under the Chevron doctrine and ruled 
that the statute is ambiguous.126  Under Chevron, a court must 
conduct a two-part analysis to determine whether an agency’s 
interpretation of a statute is entitled to deference.127  First, the 
court must determine if Congress has spoken precisely to the 
question at issue.128  If Congress has not, then the statute is 
ambiguous.129  Second, if the statute is ambiguous, the court 
must decide whether the responsible executive agency’s 
interpretation of the statute is a reasonable one.130  If reasonable, 
then the agency’s interpretation is entitled to deference.131 
The majority of district courts confronted with this statutory 
interpretation question have ruled that the text of the Dodd-
Frank Whistleblower Provisions is ambiguous under the first 
step of the Chevron analysis.132  One cited reason is to avoid 
surplusage.133  These courts determined that applying the 
statutory definition of whistleblower would render subsection (iii) 
superfluous or would render the two sections in conflict with one 
another.134  Some courts have also found that enforcing the plain  
 
 
 
 
126 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–
44 (1984) (holding that a court should defer to a responsible executive agency's 
permissible construction of a statute where the statutory language is ambiguous or 
otherwise does not speak precisely to the question at issue). 
127 See id. 
128 See id. at 842–43. 
129 See id. at 843. 
130 See id. 
131 See id. at 843–44. 
132 See, e.g., Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 119 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1104–05 (N.D. 
Cal. 2015); Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters (Mkts.) LLC, 984 F. Supp. 2d 141, 147–
48 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Ellington v. Giacoumakis, 977 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 (D. Mass. 
2013); Murray v. UBS Sec., LLC, No. 12 Civ. 5914(JMF), 2013 WL 2190084, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013); Genberg v. Porter, 935 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1106 (D. Colo. 
2013); Kramer v. Trans-Lux Corp., No. 3:11cv1424 (SRU), 2012 WL 4444820, at *4 
(D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2012); Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202(LBS), 2011 
WL 1672066, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011). 
133 Somers, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 1102. 
134 See id. at 1100; Yang v. Navigators Grp., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 519, 534 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014); Rosenblum, 984 F. Supp. 2d at 147–48; Murray, 2013 WL 2190084, 
at *4; Genberg, 935 F. Supp. 2d at 1106; Egan, 2011 WL 1672066, at *5. 
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definition of whistleblower would render the words “to the 
Commission” in subsection (i) superfluous135 and have considered 
legislative history and public policy as controlling factors.136 
Under the second step of the Chevron test, courts presume 
that a responsible agency’s interpretation of a term is 
reasonable.137  Every court that has reached this step of the 
Chevron analysis has ruled that the SEC’s interpretation of the 
Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions is a reasonable one and, as 
a result, entitled to deference.138  The primary reason is that the 
SEC’s interpretation settles the ambiguity that courts have found 
between the definition section and the antiretaliation 
provision.139 
3. Reading Subsection (iii) as an Implied Exception to the 
Whistleblower Definition 
The third interpretation of the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower 
Provisions is that subsection (iii) provides an implied exception to 
the definition of a whistleblower.140  Under this reading, a person 
is a whistleblower if she discloses information to the SEC or 
meets one of the three categories of disclosure under subsection 
(iii).141  District courts that have employed this interpretation 
reason that this interpretation preserves the statutory text while 
giving effect to SEC Rule 21F.142 
 
135 Somers, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 1102; Egan, 2011 WL 1672066, at *5. 
136 Somers, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 1103 (reasoning that because subsection (iii) was 
added at the last minute, it is reasonable to assume that Congress did not intend for 
this subsection to be limited to only those whistleblowers who report to the SEC); 
Kramer, 2012 WL 4444820, at *4 (reasoning that it is not “unambiguously clear that 
the Dodd-Frank Act’s retaliation provision only applies to those individuals who 
have provided information relating to a securities violation to the [SEC] . . . [as that] 
interpretation would dramatically narrow the available protections available to 
potential whistleblowers.”). 
137 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–
44 (1984). 
138 See, e.g., Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 155 (2d Cir. 2015); 
Somers, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 1105–06; Rosenblum, 984 F. Supp. 2d at 147–48; 
Ellington v. Giacoumakis, 977 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 (D. Mass. 2013); Kramer, 2012 WL 
4444820 at *5. 
139 See Somers, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 1105; Rosenblum, 984 F. Supp. 2d at 147–48; 
Murray, 2013 WL 2190084, at *5. 
140 See Yang v. Navigators Grp., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 519, 532, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014); Murray, 2013 WL 2190084, at *5; Genberg, 935 F. Supp. 2d at 1106; Egan, 
2011 WL 1672066, at *5. 
141 See, e.g., Murray, 2013 WL 2190084, at *5. 
142 See, e.g., Yang, 18 F. Supp. 3d at 534. 
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III. A PLAIN, UNAMBIGUOUS READING OF THE STATUTE IS THE 
CORRECT READING AND IS THE POLICY THAT CONGRESS INTENDED 
A. Statutory Interpretation 
It is the preeminent canon of statutory interpretation that 
courts “presume that [the] legislature says in a statute what it 
means and means in a statute what it says there.”143  The first 
step of statutory interpretation is to determine if the text is plain 
and unambiguous.144  Judges have long recognized that if a 
statute is plain and unambiguous, a court must apply the statute 
according to its terms.145  Ambiguity is defined as “doubtfulness 
or uncertainty of meaning or intention, as in a contractual term 
or statutory provision.”146  In the context of statutory 
interpretation, ambiguity is “the doubt which a judge must 
entertain before she can search for and, if possible, apply a 
secondary meaning.”147  In order to determine if a statute is 
 
143 BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 US 176, 183 (2004) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Conn. Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992)). 
144 Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 387 (2009) (citing United States v. 
Gonzalez, 520 U.S. 1, 4 (1997)). 
145 See, e.g., Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 251 (2010) 
(“We must enforce plain and unambiguous statutory language according to its 
terms.”); Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 387 (“[W]e must apply [an unambiguous] statute 
according to its terms.”); Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 359 (2005) (alteration 
in original) (“[W]e are not free to rewrite the statute that Congress has enacted. 
‘[W]hen the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least 
where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to 
its terms.’ ” (quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N. A., 
530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000))); Lamie v. United States Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (“It is 
well established that ‘when the statute's language is plain, the sole function of the 
courts—at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to 
enforce it according to its terms.’ ” (quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 530 U.S. 
at 6)); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) (“[The Court’s] inquiry 
must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and ‘the statutory scheme is 
coherent and consistent.’ ” (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 
235, 240 (1989)); Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244, 260 (1945) (“The plain words 
and meaning of a statute cannot be overcome by a legiselative [sic] history which, 
through strained processes of deduction from events of wholly ambiguous 
significance, may furnish dubious bases for inference in every direction.”); Caminetti 
v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (“It is elementary that . . . if [the meaning 
of the statute] is plain . . . the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to 
its terms.”); Thornley v. United States, 113 U.S. 310, 313 (1885) (“Where the 
meaning of a statute is plain, it is the duty of the courts to enforce it according to its 
obvious terms.”). 
146 Ambiguity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
147 Id. (quoting RUPERT CROSS, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 76–77 (1st ed. 
1976)). 
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ambiguous, a court looks to “the language itself, the specific 
context in which that language is used, and the broader context 
of the statute as a whole.”148  While even textualist readers admit 
that a definition can be contradicted by other indications,149 
“[w]hen . . . a definitional section says that a word ‘means’ 
something, the clear import is that this is its only meaning.”150  A 
court may not refuse to enforce the plain reading of the statute 
simply because it would create a hardship.151 
Where a statute is clear, a court should not resort to 
reviewing legislative history—this “only muddies the waters.”152  
There are strong reasons why.  First, legislative materials 
generally contain the thoughts of only a handful of 
representatives who actively discussed the bill at issue.153  “[I]t is 
impossible to aggregate the individual expectations of 435 House 
Members and match them up with an aggregation of as many as 
100 Senators and with the President’s intent when he or she 
signs the measure into law.”154  Second, using legislative history 
affords judges the opportunity to supplant the plain meaning of a 
statute with whatever external evidence they can locate favoring 
their own ideological views.155  That is not to say that all judges 
 
148 Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341. 
149 See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 228 (2012). 
150 Id. at 226. 
151 Helvering v. N.Y. Tr. Co., 292 U.S. 455, 464 (1934) (“The rule that, where the 
statute contains no ambiguity, it must be taken literally and given effect accor[d]ing 
to its language, is a sound one not to be put aside to avoid hardships that may 
sometimes result from giving effect to the legislative purpose.”); Corona Coal Co. v. 
United States, 263 U.S. 537, 540 (1924) (“[When] the words of the statute are plain, 
with nothing in the context to make their meaning doubtful [and] no room is left for 
construction . . . we are not at liberty to add an exception in order to remove 
apparent hardship in particular cases.”); Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 
U.S. 1, 33 (1895) (“It is not only the safer course to adhere to the words of a statute, 
construed in their ordinary import, instead of entering into any inquiry as to the 
supposed intention of congress, but it is the imperative duty of the court to do so.”); 
see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 149, at 181 (“Not every harsh result indicates 
a contradiction that must be ‘reconciled’ away.”). 
152 United States v. Gonzalez, 520 U.S. 1, 4 (1997). 
153 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., ABBE R. GLUCK & VICTORIA F. NOURSE, 
STATUTES, REGULATION, AND INTERPRETATION: LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION 
IN THE REPUBLIC OF STATUTES 605 (2014) [hereinafter LEGISLATION AND 
ADMINISTRATION]. 
154 Id. (citing Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870–71 
(1930)). 
155 See id. at 603 (noting the concern that judges should not usurp plain 
meaning by relying on legislative history to favor their own ideological views). 
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are willfully manipulative.  They may use legislative history to 
unconsciously reinforce their own dispositions toward the 
statute.156  Third, a heavy emphasis on legislative history creates 
a perverse incentive for lobbyists and legislators “to stack the 
legislative history.”157  It is much easier for interest groups “to 
insert language into a committee report than to alter the 
language of a statute.”158  These arguments do not suggest that 
legislative history should never be used; rather, the use of 
legislative history should be reserved for situations where 
statutes are facially ambiguous.159 
The surplusage canon is another canon of statutory 
interpretation, which states, “if possible, every word and every 
provision [of a statute] is to be given effect.”160  The surplusage 
canon exemplifies the idea that it is not within a court’s function 
to remove language from a statute.161  But the surplusage canon 
is not always dispositive because “drafters do repeat themselves 
and do include words that add nothing of substance, either out of 
a flawed sense of style or to . . . [use the] belt-and-suspenders 
approach.”162  Sometimes Congress intentionally adds 
redundancies to ensure the needs of various supporters and 
interest groups are satisfied.163 
Statutory analysis often involves administrative law analysis 
because Congress delegates rulemaking authority to executive 
agencies.164  To determine if an agency interpretation of a statute 
is entitled to deference, courts conduct a Chevron analysis.165  
 
156 KENT GREENAWALT, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 20 QUESTIONS 181 (1999). 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: A 
RE-EVALUATION OF THE STATUS OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 74–77 (1989). 
160 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 149, at 174. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 176–77. 
163 LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 153, at 468 (citing Abbe R. 
Gluck & Linda Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An 
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 
STAN. L. REV. 901, 933–36 (2013)). 
164 Here, Congress has delegated rulemaking authority to the SEC. See 
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(j) (2012) (“The Commission shall have the authority to issue such 
rules and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to implement the 
provisions of this section consistent with the purposes of this section.”). 
165 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–
44 (1984). 
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First, a court must determine whether Congress has directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue.166  If Congress has 
directly spoken to the question at issue, the court must effectuate 
Congress’s unambiguously expressed intent.167  Fundamentally, 
this stems from the separation of powers in the Constitution.168  
The Constitution vests the power to create law with Congress, 
not administrative agencies.169  Second, and only if the court 
determines Congress has not answered the precise question at 
issue, the court must determine whether the agency’s 
interpretation of the statute is a reasonable one.170  If the 
agency’s interpretation is reasonable, then that interpretation is 
entitled to deference.171 
1. The Text of the Dodd−Frank Whistleblower Provisions Is 
Unambiguous 
The text of the Dodd−Frank Whistleblower Provisions is 
unambiguous, thus, the plain, statutory definition of 
whistleblower should be applied.  Congress expressly provided 
that a whistleblower “means any individual who 
provides . . . information relating to a violation of the securities 
laws to the Commission, in a manner established, by rule or 
regulation, by the Commission.”172  The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit and like-minded district courts 
insist that, because subsection (iii) forbids employer retaliation 
against whistleblowers for internal disclosures, it must follow 
that the term whistleblower include persons who disclose 
internally.173 
However, the Fifth Circuit and like-minded district courts 
correctly point out the major mistake that the Second Circuit and 
like-minded courts have made: they ignore the fact that the 
antiretaliation provision incorporates the statutory definition of 
 
166 Id. at 842. 
167 Id. at 842–43. 
168 See Mich. v. Envt’l Prot. Agency, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2713 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
169 See id. 
170 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
171 Id. 
172 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012). Recall that when Congress says a term 
“means” something that is its only meaning. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 149, 
at 226. 
173 See, e.g., Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 154–55 (2d Cir. 2015); 
Ellington v.Giacoumakis, 977 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45–46 (D. Mass. 2013). 
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whistleblower.174  As the Berman dissent points out, there is no 
conflict or ambiguity; there is merely a statute that provides 
protection that judges and the SEC find suboptimal.175  It is 
improper for the courts to hide behind the veil of ambiguity to 
avoid hardships that may sometimes result from giving effect to 
the statutory protection as written.176  The courts should not 
make rulings “based solely on a disagreement about public 
policy.”177 
The Second Circuit and like-minded district courts 
incorrectly reasoned that a plain reading of the statute would 
render subsection (iii) superfluous.178  However, even the Second 
Circuit admitted that subsection (iii) would not be superfluous—
just “extremely limited [in] scope”179—in its response to the Fifth 
Circuit’s reasoning that subsection (iii) is not superfluous 
because it protects whistleblowers that report to the SEC and 
internally simultaneously.180  As the Berman dissent points out, 
it is unclear why this timing of reporting is relevant; an 
individual might disclose to multiple people at the same time or 
over a longer period.181  Nothing in the antiretaliation provision 
prevents a person from reporting to the SEC to qualify as a 
whistleblower and then, at some later date, reporting to an 
internal compliance program.182  The only important timing 
factor is if and when an employer learns that an employee has 
reported to the SEC.183  Subsection (iii) is best understood as 
protecting whistleblowers who have reported violations to the 
SEC without their employer’s knowledge from retaliation, based 
on an internal report of the same securities law violation.  That 
is, if subsection (iii) did not exist, then an employer would only be 
 
174 Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 626–27 (5th Cir. 2013); 
Banko v. Apple Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 749, 756 (N.D. Cal. 2013). In a clever sleight of 
hand, the SEC also uses the terms “whistleblower” and “individual” interchangeably 
in its arguments. See SEC 2d Cir. Amicus Brief, supra note 64, at 13–15. 
175 Berman, 801 F.3d at 158–59 (Dennis, J., dissenting). 
176 Helvering v. New York Tr. Co., 292 U.S. 455, 464 (1934). 
177 Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 3d 640, 644 (E.D. Wis. 
2014). 
178 See, e.g., Berman, 801 F.3d at 151; Somers v. Digital Realty Tr., Inc., 119 F. 
Supp. 3d 1088, 1100 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
179 Berman, 801 F.3d at 151. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 157 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). 
182 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012). 
183 See Verble v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC, 148 F. Supp. 3d 644, 648 
(E.D. Tenn. 2015); supra notes 110–112 and accompanying text. 
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prohibited from retaliating against an employee for a report to 
the SEC or for obeying a judicial subpoena.  This would give the 
employer an opportunity to argue that it did not terminate the 
employee for the report to the SEC because the employer did not 
know about the report to the SEC.  Indeed, the employer could 
explain that it terminated the employee because of the internal 
report, not the report to the SEC.  Without subsection (iii) this 
would be unsavory, but not prohibited. 
Some district courts also cite the surplusage canon to 
support their rulings that the statute is ambiguous; particularly, 
that the plain reading of the statute renders “to the Commission” 
in subsection (i) superfluous.184  As noted earlier, the surplusage 
canon is not always dispositive; Congress sometimes creates 
redundancies intentionally.185  It is perfectly reasonable to think 
that Congress was redundantly clarifying the antiretaliation 
provision, which has six sections between it and the definition 
section.186  More problematic is that, in an effort to avoid finding 
a small clause superfluous, these district courts have rendered 
superfluous the entire statutory definition of whistleblower.187 
According to the Second Circuit, the plain reading of the 
statute also presents another problem with subsection (iii):  
Under SOX, auditors and attorneys are required to report 
internally before reporting to the SEC.188  The Second Circuit 
reasoned that Congress could not have intended to exclude these 
two groups from whistleblower protection.189 
The statute does not, under any section, address whether 
any groups are to be excluded from the definition of 
whistleblower.190  In this statutory silence, SEC regulations have 
created categorical exceptions, making certain groups ineligible 
for whistleblower rewards.191  Several prominent independent 
 
184 Somers v. Digital Realty Tr., Inc., 119 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1102–03 (N.D. Cal. 
2015); Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202(LBS), 2011 WL 1672066, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
185 See supra notes 160–162 and accompanying text. 
186 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6. 
187 Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 3d 640, 645 (E.D. Wis. 
2014). 
188 Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2016). 
189 Id. at 151–52, 155. 
190 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6. 
191 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–4(b)(4) (2011) (excluding auditors, attorneys, and 
internal compliance personnel by creating a rule that information obtained for an 
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auditing firms voiced strong objections to proposed Rule 21F–4,192 
which was unclear on whether auditors would be eligible for 
whistleblower awards.193  In addition to individual firms, auditor 
associations objected to the proposed rules, requesting that the 
SEC categorically exclude auditors from whistleblower awards 
because allowing auditors to receive such awards would 
discourage the free flow of honest information to the auditor.194  
One commenter noted that auditors have other reporting 
 
audit, legal advice, or internal compliance does not qualify as “independent 
knowledge”). 
192 All of the “Big Four” accounting firms filed comments criticizing this 
provision of proposed rule 21F–4. See, e.g., Comment Letter on Proposed Rules for 
Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 from PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, to SEC (Dec. 22, 2010) (on 
file with SEC), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-281.pdf (“[W]e believe 
that the whistleblower rules should not establish an alternative reporting channel 
for any information derived by accounts from performance of a professional 
engagement. [W]e agree with the exclusion of information reported by accountants 
regarding violations by an engagement client or the client’s personnel.”); Comment 
Letter on Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 
21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 from Ernst & Young LLP, to Elizabeth 
M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 17, 2010) [hereinafter Ernst & Young Comment Letter] 
(on file with SEC), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-176.pdf (“[T]he 
Proposing Release states, awards would be available ‘with respect to the 
independent accountant’s performance of the engagement itself . . . . We do not 
believe this aspect of the Rule Proposal is workable or necessary, and it is likely to 
disrupt the traditional sort of trust and dialogue that must exist within an audit 
engagement team to perform an effective audit.”); Comment Letter on Proposed 
Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 from Deloitte LLP, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, 
SEC (Dec. 17, 2010) (on file with SEC), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-
10/s73310-184.pdf (“Deloitte strongly supports implementation of an exclusion in the 
Proposed Rules for individuals who obtained their information through the audit of a 
company’s financial statements and for whom making a whistleblower submission 
would be contrary to the requirements of Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934.”); Comment Letter on Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower 
Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 from KPMG LLP, to 
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 17, 2010) (on file with SEC), 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-152.pdf (stating that the proposed 
eligibility exclusion is “too narrow” and would encourage accountants to violate 
professional standards). 
193 See Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 75 Fed. Reg. 70488, 70493 (proposed Nov. 17, 2010) 
(codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)). 
194 See, e.g., Comment Letter on Proposed Rules for Implementing the 
Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 from 
Cynthia M. Fornelli, Exec. Dir., Ctr. for Audit Quality, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, 
Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 23, 2010) (on file with SEC), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-
10/s73310-242.pdf. 
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requirements and protections available to them.195  After 
reviewing comments, the SEC’s final rule excluded auditors by 
determining that knowledge gained by an internal audit did not 
qualify as “independent knowledge.”196  Therefore, the Second 
Circuit’s concern about auditors being unprotected is unfounded 
because, under SEC regulations, auditors are already excluded 
from whistleblower awards. 
The SEC, in its proposed rules, recognized that attorneys 
should also be categorically excluded from whistleblower 
awards.197  When a commenter suggested that lawyers should be 
eligible for awards based on nonprivileged information, the 
American Bar Association (“ABA”) replied with serious 
concerns.198  The ABA was concerned that whistleblower awards: 
[M]ay create a strong incentive for a lawyer to compromise his 
or her ethical obligations and undermine the client confidence 
that the U.S. Supreme Court [has] recognized . . . as critical in 
assuring the continued effectiveness of the attorney-client 
privilege and the work product doctrine.  A client’s awareness 
that its attorneys may use information provided confidentially 
to obtain large whistleblower awards could well prevent the free 
flow of information necessary to the client’s right to effective 
counsel.199 
In light of these strong objections, the SEC’s final rule excluded 
attorneys from obtaining whistleblower awards from any 
knowledge gained by the attorney-client relationship, including 
 
195 See Ernst & Young Comment Letter, supra note 192 (“[U]nlike the typical 
corporate employee, for whom Congress clearly thought a bounty could encourage 
reporting of wrongdoing, accountants are already subject to reporting requirements 
by virtue of their professional status.”). 
196 See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 FR 34300, 
34317–18 (June 13, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–4(b)(4)). Under 
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012), a person must give “original information” to qualify for a 
whistleblower award. § 78u-6 (a)(3)(A) (“The term ‘original information’ means 
information that . . . is derived from the independent knowledge . . . of a 
whistleblower.”). Because “original information” is a vague term, the SEC has 
promulgated rules to clarify. 
197 See Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 75 Fed. Reg. 70488, 70492. (proposed Nov. 17, 
2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)). 
198 See generally Comment Letter on Proposed Rules for Implementing the 
Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 from 
Stephen N. Zack, President, American Bar Association, to Mary L. Schapiro, 
Chairwoman, SEC (May 20, 2011) (on file with SEC), https://www.sec.gov/comments/ 
s7-33-10/s73310-315.pdf. 
199 Id. at 3. 
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from nonprivileged information.200  Thus, the Second Circuit’s 
concern about attorneys being unprotected is also unfounded 
because attorneys are already excluded from whistleblower 
awards under SEC regulations. 
2. Reading Subsection (iii) as a Judicially-Implied Exception Is 
Improper 
Courts may not create exceptions to a statute if a plain 
provision of the statute does not contain one.201  Moreover, when 
a statute contains exceptions, courts do not have authority to 
create others,202 even if the absence of an exception within the 
statute may produce harsh results.203 
The SEC’s structuralist choices regarding categorical 
exceptions204 support the result that the antiretaliation provision 
is not an appropriate location for an exception to a statutory 
definition located in a different section of the Dodd-Frank 
Whistleblower Provisions.  Because the SEC chose to exclude 
certain categories of individuals by creating regulations 
concerning the definition of “independent knowledge,”205 the SEC 
impliedly admitted that the definition section, and not the 
antiretaliation provision, is the appropriate section to find 
exceptions to the whistleblower definition. 
Even if the antiretaliation provision was an appropriate 
location for an exception to the whistleblower definition, the text 
of the antiretaliation provision is not styled as an exception.  
Subsection (iii) is not grammatically or structurally different 
from subsections (i) and (ii).206  As one court noted, all subsection 
(iii) does is provide disclosure protections for individuals in 
addition to the protection triggered by the first disclosure to the 
Commission.207 
 
200 See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34300, 
34314–15 (June 13, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)). 
201 Lessee of French v. Spencer, 62 U.S. 228, 238 (1858). 
202 United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 58 (2000). 
203 See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
204 See supra notes 188–197 and accompanying text. 
205 See supra notes 188–197 and accompanying text. 
206 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2012). 
207 See Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 3d 640, 645 (E.D. Wis. 
2014). 
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3. Legislative History Indicates That Congress Wanted 
Whistleblowers To Disclose to the SEC 
Courts rely on the fact that Congress added subsection (iii) 
at the eleventh hour to support the conclusion that Congress 
could not have intended subsection (iii) to be such a narrow 
exception.208  But such courts ignore the specific statements of 
the House and Senate reports, both of which indicate that 
Congress’s primary goal was to persuade potential 
whistleblowers to disclose to the SEC.209  This is far more 
concrete evidence than inferential “ ‘doubt[s]’ about what was 
going on in the heads of individual ‘conferees’ during the 
legislative process.”210 
B. Implications 
This plain reading of the statute has practical implications 
for real world behavior.  This Section addresses those 
implications for three distinct groups: (1) potential 
whistleblowers; (2) employers; and (3) the SEC. 
First, due to the split of authority between the Second and 
Fifth Circuits, potential whistleblowers will likely begin 
reporting directly to the SEC in order to qualify for 
antiretaliation protection.  This presents two likely future 
scenarios: (1) potential whistleblowers will report internally and 
to the SEC simultaneously, or (2) potential whistleblowers will 
report directly to the SEC and not report internally at all.  While 
this appears to give incomplete protection to whistleblowers who 
only report internally, recall that one of the purposes of the 
Dodd-Frank Act was “[t]o promote the financial stability of the 
United States by improving accountability and transparency in 
the financial system . . . .”211  Whistleblowers are a means to 
achieving financial stability because whistleblowers report 
 
208 See, e.g., Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 155 (2d Cir. 2015). 
209 Both the House and Senate reports indicate that Congress’s intent was to 
increase the flow of information to the SEC. See supra notes 48–49 and 
accompanying text. 
210 Berman, 801 F.3d at 160 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (citing to majority language 
at 155). 
211 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, 
and 15 U.S.C.). 
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hidden securities fraud based on firsthand knowledge of facts 
that would not ordinarily be available to regulators.212  This 
reading does not leave potential whistleblowers without recourse; 
they still have a cause of action under SOX, which protects 
internal disclosures.213 
Second, employers may be alarmed that their internal 
compliance policies are futile.  However, there is still a strong 
incentive to report internally because Dodd-Frank whistleblower 
awards are higher if the whistleblower reports internally.214  
Also, after research, the SEC concluded that most whistleblowers 
who report internally are motivated by nonmonetary reasons, 
usually a sense of loyalty to the employer or of social welfare,215 
which means that those who already report internally will 
continue to do so.  If employers are still concerned about 
preserving the status quo of their compliance systems, they 
should petition the SEC to have the SEC revise its rules to 
require simultaneous reporting, which would be consistent with 
Congress’s explicit requirement that an individual report to the 
SEC to qualify as a whistleblower.216 
The SEC may have three concerns with this reading: (1) that 
the agency might be overwhelmed with frivolous complaints; 
(2) that the statute will not sufficiently protect potential 
 
212 See Matt A. Vega, Beyond Incentives: Making Corporate Whistleblowing 
Moral in the New Era of Dodd-Frank Act “Bounty Hunting,” 45 CONN. L. REV. 483, 
519 (2012). 
213 See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2012); see also discussion supra Section I.A. 
214 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–6(a)(4) (2011). 
215 Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34300, 
34360, n.453 (June 13, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)). 
216 During the comment period on the proposed rules, many companies and 
organizations suggested using internal compliance programs simultaneously with 
SEC reporting or before reporting to the SEC to handle the alleged violation 
internally. See e.g., Hearing on Legis. Proposals To Address the Negative 
Consequences of the Dodd Frank Whistleblower Provisions Before the Subcomm. on 
Capital Mkts. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters., 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Ken 
Daly, President and CEO, NACD), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-
312.pdf.; Comment Letter on Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower 
Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 from Robert A. 
Long, Covington & Burling LLP, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (February 18, 
2011) (on file with SEC), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-283.pdf; 
Comment Letter on Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions 
of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 from Neila B. Radin, Chair, 
Soc’y of Corporate Sec’ys & Governance Prof’ls, to Elizabeth M. Murphey, SEC (Dec. 
17, 2010) (on file with SEC), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-230.pdf; 
Ass’n of Bank Dirs. Comment Letter, supra note 58. 
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whistleblowers that report to internal compliance programs; and 
(3) that the statute will not sufficiently protect potential 
whistleblowers who report to federal law enforcement agencies or 
self-regulatory organizations (“SROs”).  The first issue has 
already been resolved by the SEC Rule 21F-2(a)(2) which 
requires that there be a possible violation,217 coupled with a 
requirement that a potential whistleblower make the disclosures 
subject to the penalty of perjury.218  By enforcing these 
requirements, the SEC can ensure that it continues to receive 
non-frivolous complaints.  For example, in 2014, the SEC 
permanently disqualified an individual from any future award 
because the individual filed 196 separate administrative actions 
using false information and baseless claims.219 
To address the second issue, the SEC should amend its rules 
to require simultaneous internal disclosure and disclosure to the 
SEC.220  Several organizations suggested this approach during 
the comment period,221 but the SEC rejected it.222  The SEC 
should reconsider this proposal as a means of protecting potential 
whistleblowers that report to internal compliance programs. 
Last, despite its rhetoric, discouraging reports to federal law 
enforcement agencies223 is a nonissue for potential Dodd-Frank 
whistleblowers.  The SEC has offered no evidence supporting its 
assertion that this is a significant issue.  In its amicus briefs, the 
SEC asserts that this is an issue, and uses the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (the “FBI”) as an example, but offers no 
information on how often whistleblowers report to law 
 
217 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(a)(1) (2011). 
218 See id. § 240.21F-9. 
219 2014 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 14–15. 
220 The author suggests this course of action because it is unlikely that the ideal 
result—congressional clarification—will take place because of current congressional 
gridlock and inactivity. See Drew Desilver, In Late Spurt of Activity, Congress Avoids 
‘Least Productive’ Title, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Dec. 29, 2014), http://www.pew 
research.org/fact-tank/2014/12/29/in-late-spurt-of-activity-congress-avoids-least-
productive-title. 
221 See supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
222 Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34300, 
34361 (June 13, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)). 
223 The SEC concedes that reports to state attorneys general would never qualify 
as “to the Commission” under subsection (iii). SEC 2d Cir. Amicus Brief, supra note 
64, at n.27; Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant at 15 n.28, Verble 
v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, No. 15-06397, 2016 WL 492224 (6th Cir. Feb. 
4, 2016) [hereinafter SEC 6th Cir. Amicus Brief]. 
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enforcement agencies rather than reporting to the SEC.224  In its 
2015 report to Congress, the Office of the Whistleblower provided 
detailed information about how many tips are given to the SEC, 
where those tips originate from geographically, and what types of 
allegations are made.225  Noticeably, however, the report had no 
information on how many tips were referred to the SEC by 
federal law enforcement agencies.226  In its Securities Fraud 
Awareness & Prevention Tips sheet, the FBI advises investors to 
file a complaint with the SEC.227  In fact, the FBI does not even 
list itself on its own list of who to contact and, instead, merely 
states that a whistleblower could file a complaint with “a law 
enforcement agency.”228  Therefore, the SEC’s concern about 
discouraging reports to federal law enforcement agencies is 
unfounded. 
For similar reasons, discouraging reports to self-regulatory 
organizations (“SROs”) is an unfounded issue for potential Dodd-
Frank whistleblowers.  Again, the Office of the Whistleblower 
provided no information in its 2015 report on how many referrals 
it receives from SROs.229  Other sources provide only imprecise 
figures.  For example, the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority (“FINRA”) referred approximately 700 cases to the 
SEC for investigation, but it did not provide a detailed 
breakdown based on types of claim.230  FINRA did provide some 
examples of claims that were referred to the SEC; however, 
 
224 See SEC 2d Cir Amicus Brief, supra note 64; SEC 6th Cir. Amicus Brief, 
supra note 223. 
225 SEC, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DODD-FRANK 
WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 21–24, 28–30, https://www.sec.gov/whistleblower/reports 
pubs/annual-reports/owb-annual-report-2015.pdf [hereinafter 2015 ANNUAL 
REPORT]. 
226 See generally id. 
227 Securities Fraud Awareness & Prevention Tips, FED. BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/securities-fraud (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2016). 
228 See id. 
229 See 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 225. 
230 Office of Fraud Detection and Market Intelligence, FIN. INDUSTRY REG. 
AUTHORITY, http://www.finra.org/industry/ofdmi [hereinafter OFDMI] (last visited 
Nov. 7, 2016). This Note only discusses reports made to FINRA because both the 
New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ direct complaints and inquiries to FINRA. 
See Complaints and Inquiries, N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE, https://www.nyse.com/ 
regulation/complaints-and-inquiries (last visited Nov. 7, 2016); Contact NASDAQ, 
NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/help/contact-information.aspx (last visited Nov. 7, 
2016). 
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“Office of the Whistleblower” is last on the list provided.231  
Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that whistleblowers—
insiders of a company and experienced professionals in the 
securities industry—are aware that possible securities law 
violations should be reported directly to the SEC, which is “the 
primary overseer and regulator of the U.S. securities markets.”232  
Therefore, any implications of this plain, unambiguous reading of 
the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions are without merit or 
insignificant. 
CONCLUSION 
A plain, unambiguous reading of the Dodd-Frank 
whistleblower provision is correct, and courts should give effect 
to Congress’s intent.  In light of the growing uncertainty as a 
result of the split of authority among circuit courts, concerned 
employers should petition the SEC to amend its regulations, and 
the SEC should amend its regulations.  Unless Congress or the 
Supreme Court weigh in—which is unlikely233—the burden 
remains with the SEC to amend its unsound regulations to 
protect only those individuals who report to the SEC or to require 
simultaneous disclosure.  In this way, everyone reports to the 
SEC, and everyone is protected. 
 
231 See OFDMI, supra note 230. 
232 What We Do, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited 
Nov. 7, 2016). 
233 See Desilver, supra note 220. 
